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Introduction 
 
 
The New “Lions of Syria” 
Salafist and Jihadist Groups Dominate Insurgency 
Guido Steinberg 
Almost three years into the Syrian uprising, Islamist groups of various colour have 
established themselves as the dominant force among the rebels. The jihadists of the 
Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria represent two especially powerful 
groupings. Their growing strength has led international donors to reduce their sup-
port, and has sown violent conflict among the rebel groups. This has strengthened the 
position of President Assad, who has been arguing ever since 2011 that his adversaries 
are terrorists. Today there are indeed Islamist terrorists on the ground, enormously 
complicating the West’s search for a Syria strategy. Neither the continuation of the 
Assad regime nor a take-over by the insurgents would be in the German interest. As 
long as this dilemma continues, Germany should concentrate on humanitarian aid 
and counter-terrorism, and to that end improve cooperation with Turkey. 
 
Late 2013 and early 2014 saw heavy fight-
ing in Syria pitting the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) against the Nusra Front and 
an alliance of Islamists calling itself the 
Islamic Front. This drew the West’s atten-
tion to the Islamist and jihadist forces that 
have come to dominate an uprising that 
began as a peaceful and unideological pro-
test movement against the Assad regime. 
Four Phases of Insurgency 
The strengthening of ISIS is the most im-
portant characteristic of the latest phase of 
the Syrian uprising, which began in April 
2013 with the proclamation of the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria by the leader of 
al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This 
marked the provisional high point of 
the rise of Islamist and jihadist groups, 
a process which had been observed since 
2012. 
First Protests (February to mid-2011) 
The first significant protests in Syria 
occurred in March 2011, initially in rural 
areas and small towns in the country’s 
largely Sunni-populated regions in the 
north and east. Although the demonstra-
tions were peaceful, the regime cracked 
down brutally. Army deserters and armed 
civilians responded by attempting to pro-
tect demonstrations, firing at advancing 
security forces to delay or stop them. 
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 From Protest Movement to Insurgency 
(mid- to late 2011) 
By the end of 2011 the protests had devel-
oped into an armed insurgency, whose 
protagonists were organised in local groups 
without central control. The rebellion 
spread to the cities of Hama and Homs in 
the centre of the country, and by late 2011 
Homs had become its first major strong-
hold. 
Nascent Civil War and the Rise of the 
Islamists (early 2012 to spring 2013) 
By early 2012 the uprising had reached 
large parts of the country and was turn-
ing into civil war. The rebels now took to 
the offensive from their rural strongholds, 
attempting to cut the regime’s lines of com-
munication in the east, north and centre 
and capture its military bases there. By sum-
mer 2012 they were also attacking Aleppo, 
where the outcome was a stalemate with 
regime forces continuing to hold parts of 
the city and its airport. 
The situation at the end of 2012 was 
mixed. The regime had recaptured large 
parts of Homs and stopped the rebel ad-
vance in Aleppo. But the insurgents were 
now on the offensive in Damascus too, and 
it was becoming increasingly apparent that 
Islamist groups were growing in strength. 
Regime Recovery and Rebel Infighting 
(April 2013 to spring 2014) 
In the latest phase the regime has been 
able to further consolidate its position 
through territorial gains in the centre of 
the country. In August the first larger-scale 
use of chemical weapons by the regime 
represented a major escalation. An autono-
mous force of jihadists calling itself the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria quickly grew 
to become a major challenge to all other 
rebel organisations, leading to clashes 
between insurgent groups. In November 
a number of groups joined to form the 
Islamic Front, which has since launched 
massive operations against ISIS. 
The Insurgent Groups 
The local insurgent organisations have 
established themselves as the central 
opposition actors and are impervious to 
any political control. The exile opposition 
organised in the Syrian National Coalition 
has little influence on the situation in the 
country. 
The biggest current problem for the 
insurgents is their lack of central coordina-
tion. Their movement is a conglomerate of 
at least several dozen groups of different 
sizes and strengths, entering into changing 
alliances and subject to frequent splits. Yet 
despite sometimes considerable ideological 
and strategic differences, for a long time 
the rebels succeeded in pursuing their com-
mon goal – toppling the Assad regime – 
without major confrontations. 
Most estimates put the total number 
of insurgents at 80,000 to 100,000; at the 
beginning of 2014 this included at least 
8,000 foreigners, most of them Arabs (other 
estimates claim up to 17,000). The rebel 
movement comprises three currents: 
the Free Syrian Army, the Islamists and 
Salafists, and the jihadists. 
Free Syrian Army 
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) emerged in 
July 2011 as an umbrella organisation for 
the resistance groups that were forming 
in most parts of the country that summer. 
Most of its fighters are army deserters or 
civilians with experience of military ser-
vice. The FSA has no strong ideological 
profile, even if its leaders are secularist 
officers, and its affiliated groups belong 
to a broad spectrum that until 2012 also 
included many more moderate Islamists. 
The FSA initially set up its headquarters 
in Turkey, attracting criticism for staying 
far from the fighting until it moved into 
Syria in September 2012. At the same time, 
many groups hoped to receive access to 
international support channelled via the 
FSA. When, despite numerous announce-
ments, little in the way of foreign aid 
arrived, many groups turned away in dis-
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 appointment to seek funding opportunities 
elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, with probably tens of thou-
sands of fighters still affiliated to the FSA it 
is too soon to proclaim its demise. Its last 
bastion is in the south of the country, from 
where there have been repeated reports 
of forthcoming offensives since the end of 
2013. 
Islamists and Salafists 
From the outset many of the fighters were 
Islamists and Salafists. Some groups ini-
tially joined the FSA, but left again in 2012/ 
2013. Others always rejected any collabora-
tion with defecting officers on the basis of 
ideological differences. 
After the FSA set up its Supreme Military 
Council in December 2012, the Islamists 
and Salafists quickly responded by pro-
claiming the Syrian Islamic Front (al-Jabha 
al-Islamiya al-Suriya), whose founding mem-
bers included not only the Salafists of Ahrar 
al-Sham (The Free Men of the Levant), but 
also Suqur al-Sham (Falcons of the Levant), 
which had been part of the FSA until 2012. 
This move was the first clear sign of sharp-
ening rivalries among the Syrian insurgents. 
In November 2013 a new Islamic Front 
in Syria (al-Jabha al-Islamiya fi Suriya) was 
founded by Islamists and Salafists like 
Ahrar al-Sham, Suqur al-Sham and Liwa 
al-Tawhid (Battalion of Monotheism), as 
well as Zahran Allush’s Jaish al-Islam (Army 
of Islam) founded two months earlier in 
September. It is estimated that the new 
Islamic Front commands 40,000 to 60,000 
fighters. 
The groups that make up the Islamic 
Front all share military objectives largely 
restricted to Syria itself. Their most im-
portant stated goal is to topple the Assad 
regime and establish an Islamic state, the 
details of whose political system have yet 
to be outlined. Groups orientated on the 
Muslim Brotherhood are still present, but 
have lost influence since 2012. Instead 
Salafists like Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish 
al-Islam now dominate. 
The Islamic Front is supported primarily 
by the Arab Gulf states. Ahrar al-Sham 
receives aid from Qatar and Turkey, while 
Jaish al-Islam is a Saudi protégé. 
Jihadists 
What distinguishes the jihadists from all 
the other rebel organisations is their con-
viction that the war in Syria is merely part 
of a larger struggle that will not end with 
the fall of Bashar al-Assad. The importance 
of the fighting in Syria to al-Qaeda is dem-
onstrated by a widely viewed video message 
from its new leader Aiman al-Zawahiri, 
published in February 2012 under the title 
“Go Forward O Lions of Syria” (Ila l-amam 
ya usud al-Sham). The reference to the 
jihadist lions is a play on words, for the 
name of the dictator of Damascus, Assad, 
means “lion”. 
Absolutely in line with their mother 
organisation, the Nusra Front and ISIS hope 
to expand the armed struggle to the neigh-
bouring states and above all to attack Israel. 
As both share the ideology of al-Qaeda, it 
must also to be feared that they intend to 
carry the armed struggle beyond the Middle 
East to the Western world. They also dis-
tinguish themselves from the Islamists and 
Salafists by their routine use of suicide 
bombers. 
The jihadists have probably ceased to 
receive state support. Until 2013 Turkey 
and Qatar appear to have been supplying 
the Nusra Front with money and arms. 
Even if this is no longer the case, the Nusra 
Front continues to profit from the tolera-
tion of its fighters on Turkish soil and all 
the jihadists exploit the extensive freedom 
of movement they enjoy in Turkey. 
Donations from private supporters in 
the Gulf region reach Syria largely via 
Kuwait and represent an important source 
of jihadist funding. They also finance them-
selves through taxes and levies raised in the 
areas they control. The number of jihadists 
today is probably between 10,000 and 
30,000. 
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 Al-Qaeda versus al-Qaeda 
Syria is the only country where there have 
ever been two al-Qaeda “affiliates” oper-
ating in competition. This situation stems 
from a conflict between the al-Qaeda leader-
ship in Pakistan and the regional organi-
sation in Iraq which has been festering 
since 2004. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is not, as often 
asserted, a “branch” of al-Qaeda, but an 
independent organisation that competes 
with al-Qaeda’s central leadership for con-
trol of the jihadist movement. 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq has existed since 2004, 
when the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi (killed 2006) swore allegiance 
to Bin Laden and renamed his Iraq-based 
organisation al-Tauhid wa-l-Jihad into 
al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (al-Qaida fi Bilad 
al-Nahrain). Since 2010 the group, now 
operating as the Islamic State of Iraq 
(al-Daula al-Islamiya fi l-Iraq), has been 
led by the Iraqi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
Despite their al-Qaeda connections, 
Zarqawi and his successor never submitted 
to the authority of al-Qaeda’s central 
leadership. By renaming his group in 2004, 
Zarqawi hoped to gain recruits and dona-
tions from the Gulf region. But he pursued 
his own strategy in Iraq, based on maximis-
ing casualties in headline-grabbing bomb-
ings designed to provoke the Shiites to 
retaliate against the Sunnis and instigate a 
sectarian civil war in which, he calculated, 
his group would assume sole leadership 
of the Sunni population. Al-Qaeda’s central 
leadership repeatedly called on its com-
mander in Iraq to abandon that plan to 
avoid making enemies of the Shiites, and 
criticised his group’s excessive brutality. 
But neither Zarqawi nor his successors were 
to be persuaded. 
Zarqawi’s strength was what led the 
al-Qaeda leadership to continue tolerating 
his organisation within its network. The 
activities of al-Qaeda in Iraq gave the world 
the impression that it was dealing with a 
global network capable of bringing the 
American superpower to the brink of defeat 
in Iraq. Also, as well as Iraqis, Zarqawi also 
tied in particular Jordanians, Palestinians, 
Syrians, and Lebanese to al-Qaeda – nation-
alities from which until 2004 it won few 
recruits because they felt it was not fight-
ing for their interests, especially the 
struggle against Israel. There was in fact 
much truth in that complaint, in the sense 
that al-Qaeda was fighting first and fore-
most to drive the Americans out of the 
Middle East and then to topple the regimes 
in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Accordingly, 
until 2004 al-Qaeda was frequently seen 
as an Egyptian and Gulf Arab organisation, 
which it indeed was in terms of its person-
nel structure: it consisted largely of Saudis, 
Yemenis, Kuwaitis and Egyptians. 
The Jordanian Zarqawi in contrast 
aimed to follow victory in Iraq by carrying 
the struggle to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon 
and then “liberate Jerusalem”. To the al-
Qaeda leadership, the new recruitment 
pool appeared attractive compensation for 
its lack of control over Zarqawi’s activities, 
so they allowed him to carry on. 
After lying dormant for years, the con-
flict between Zawahiri (believed to be in 
Pakistan) and the new leader of al-Qaeda 
in Iraq, Baghdadi, exploded in 2013 over 
the question of the correct strategy for 
Syria. The Nusra Front stood for Zawahiri’s 
approach of avoiding excessive violence, 
winning over the population and cooper-
ating closely with other insurgents. ISIS 
under Baghdadi remained true to his un-
compromising stance already known from 
Iraq, and pursued a strategy of massive 
violence, terrorising the population and 
fighting against any group that refused 
to submit to his command. 
The Nusra Front  
The Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl 
al-Sham) is one of the strongest insurgent 
groups in Syria, and until April 2013 was 
by far the most important jihadist organi-
sation. While its main areas of operations 
lay in the north (Aleppo and Idlib), along 
the Euphrates Valley (Raqqa) and in the 
east (Deir ez-Zor), it was also (and remains) 
present in Damascus and in the south of 
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 the country. In March 2013, jointly with 
Ahrar al-Sham, it succeeded in capturing 
the major city of Raqqa on the middle 
Euphrates. 
The involvement of jihadists in the Syrian 
uprising first became apparent around the 
end of 2011, with the first major suicide 
car bombings in Damascus and Aleppo. The 
group must have still been very small at 
that point, but it grew steadily until spring 
2014 and could number between 5,000 and 
15,000 fighters today. Its attacks quickly 
earned it a name that attracted volunteers 
from Syria and abroad, and it also profited 
from its reputation as one of the few armed 
groups to protect the population effectively 
against Assad’s government forces. The 
weaker the FSA became, the more recruits 
the Nusra Front gained. 
The leader of the Nusra Front, Abu 
Muhammad al-Jaulani, is a Syrian who 
fought with al-Qaeda in Iraq and received 
permission in 2011 to take some of his fol-
lowers to Syria to establish a jihadist organi-
sation there. When Jaulani arrived in Syria 
in August 2011 he profited from the well-
developed infrastructure that al-Qaeda in 
Iraq already possessed there. During the 
post-2003 Iraqi insurgency against the US 
occupation Syrians represented the largest 
foreign contingent alongside the Saudis, 
and Syrians organised the transit of thou-
sands of volunteers from elsewhere through 
their country into Iraq. From 2011 the 
Nusra Front was able to draw on these net-
works in eastern and northern Syria. It 
grew quickly after its official founding in 
January 2012, and the number of attacks 
it conducted rose from April. 
The rapid advance of the Nusra Front 
was also aided by the government’s release 
of numerous militant Islamists in 2011 
and 2012. The only plausible explanation 
for this step is that the regime hoped to 
strengthen the Salafist and jihadist forces 
in order to divide the rebel movement and 
bolster Assad’s argument that the rebels 
were terrorists. The Syrian intelligence ser-
vices have a long record of manipulating 
jihadist groups. As well as tolerating the 
transit of jihadists into Iraq, until 2007 
they themselves sent many Syrians to fight 
against the Americans there. In at least one 
case there is also evidence to suggest that 
the Syrian security services conducted a 
spectacular bombing, for which they sub-
sequently blamed the jihadists. None-
theless, the Nusra Front was responsible 
for the huge majority of major attacks 
between 2011 and 2014. 
As well as toppling the regime and estab-
lishing an Islamic state, the Nusra Front’s 
objectives include “liberating” neighbour-
ing countries, although this transnational 
aspect has to date played only a minor role 
in its propaganda. To achieve its goals the 
Nusra Front seeks close cooperation with 
other insurgent groups. It concentrates 
on attacking Syrian government security 
forces and military facilities and tries to 
avoid civilian victims, in order to retain 
popular support, as well as organising 
supplies for the towns and quarters it con-
trols and where possible providing munici-
pal services. In this way the Nusra Front 
shows that it has learned from the experi-
ence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which quickly lost 
its support among the Iraqi Sunnis after 
2006 because of its insistence on exclusive 
leadership of all insurgents and its brutal 
attacks against civilians. 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
Like the Nusra Front, the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (al-Daula al-Islamiya fi 
l-Iraq wa-l-Sham, ISIS) also emerged out 
of al-Qaeda in Iraq. But it was founded later, 
as the result of the attempt by Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi to regain control over his 
followers in Syria. 
In a communiqué in April 2013 the emir 
of the Islamic State of Iraq declared that 
the Nusra Front had emerged from it, but 
that both organisations would now form 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria under 
Baghdadi’s command. The leader of the 
Nusra Front, Jaulani, responded a few days 
later, confirming the origins of his group 
but refusing to place it under Baghdadi’s 
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 authority. Instead he sought support from 
al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri, to whom he swore 
loyalty. The Nusra Front had actually hoped 
to avoid such an acknowledgement of ties 
to al-Qaeda, out of fear of losing support in 
Syria. 
Zawahiri in turn felt forced to intervene 
in the conflict between the two al-Qaeda-
“branches”. In a communiqué in May 2013 
he backed Jaulani’s position, decreeing that 
both organisations should operate indepen-
dently of one another in their respective 
homelands. But Baghdadi refused to obey 
the orders from Pakistan and insisted that 
ISIS continue to operate in both Iraq and 
Syria. In response, in January 2014, Zawa-
hiri declared the expulsion of the Islamic 
State from al-Qaeda. 
To this day ISIS stands for extreme 
hatred of Shiites (including the Syrian 
Alawis), terrorist attacks of the greatest 
brutality, an iron fist in the areas it con-
trols, and the vision of immanent war on 
Israel. To many fighters in Syria this orien-
tation appears more attractive than the 
more moderate approach of the Nusra 
Front and consequently many of them 
joined ISIS from April 2013, including an 
overwhelming majority of the foreign 
fighters. 
Until spring 2013 most foreign fighters 
joined the ranks of the Nusra Front. In the 
early days North Africans predominated, 
above all from Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Jordanians and Gulf Arabs were also strong-
ly represented, and the European contin-
gent of up to 2,000 is believed to include 
about 300 Germans. But despite their large 
numbers foreigners always remained a 
minority in the Syrian-led groups. In ISIS 
the proportion of foreigners was higher. 
Rough estimates put their strength in its 
Syrian section at about 30 to 60 percent. 
But the rapid gains made by ISIS from 
spring 2013 and its staying power through 
2014 suggest that Syrians continue to rep-
resent a majority. Many Syrians are also 
represented in the leadership alongside 
Iraqis. Altogether ISIS could also comprise 
between 5,000 and 15,000 fighters. 
From May 2013 ISIS units took over 
many positions from the Nusra Front in 
Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Idlib and Aleppo, and 
entrenched themselves in smaller towns 
like Azaz and Jarabulus north of Aleppo 
on the Turkish border. Although ISIS tried 
to emulate the Nusra Front’s methods of 
winning over the population through social 
services and integrating itself into the up-
rising through tactical cooperation, the 
brutality and aggressiveness of the ISIS 
fighters – already familiar from Iraq – 
quickly came to the fore. They enforced 
a regime of terror in the areas they con-
trolled, executed opponents and destroyed 
non-Sunni places of worship and shrines. 
They even attacked non-jihadist rebels, as 
seen first in July 2013 when ISIS fighters 
killed a prominent FSA commander. 
This and similar incidents caused grow-
ing tensions between ISIS and the other 
insurgents. While the FSA was already too 
weak to defend itself effectively, clashes 
with Islamist and Salafist groups intensi-
fied, especially with Ahrar al-Sham, which 
has a strong presence in and around Aleppo 
and suffered greatly under ISIS attacks. 
The conflicts increased after the estab-
lishment of the Islamic Front in November. 
Ahrar al-Sham now moved more decisively 
against ISIS under pressure from its new 
partners, especially the Army of Islam. 
December saw large-scale fighting between 
Ahrar and ISIS in eastern Aleppo province. 
After ISIS units kidnapped, tortured and 
killed a senior commander of Ahrar al-Sham 
at the end of December, the tensions erupted 
into large-scale fighting. 
Ahrar al-Sham 
The example of the “The Free Men of the 
Levant” demonstrates how difficult it is to 
distinguish between jihadists and Salafists 
in practice if the latter take up armed 
struggle. 
Ahrar al-Sham is the most important 
member of the Islamic Front, and with 
10,000 to 20,000 men probably the strongest 
insurgent group of all. Since it first became 
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 clearly visible in January 2012 it has been 
involved in most of the decisive military 
clashes. The Ahrar says its aims go no 
further than overthrowing Assad and estab-
lishing an Islamic state in Syria. Although 
it is indeed more strongly focused on the 
local situation than the jihadists, the dif-
ference is only one of degree, as its procla-
mations reveal that Ahrar al-Sham rejects 
Syria’s contemporary borders. Reflecting 
their ideological closeness, its leader Hassan 
Abbud has repeatedly spoken positively 
about the Nusra Front and the two groups 
routinely work together in the current 
fighting. 
The relative nature of the differences to 
the jihadists is also reflected in personnel 
questions. When al-Qaeda leader Aiman 
al-Zawahiri appointed a personal envoy 
in Syria in June 2013, he chose the veteran 
Abu Khalid al-Suri (alias Muhammad 
Bahaia). Suri was not, as would have been 
expected, a member of the Nusra Front, but 
a leader of Ahrar al-Sham. The best-known 
religious theoretician of the Islamic Front 
and Ahrar, the prominent cleric Abu Basir 
al-Tartusi, is also regarded as a jihadist. 
Unlike the religious advisers of the Nusra 
Front and ISIS, however, Tartusi rejects 
suicide attacks. But in joint operations the 
Nusra Front will sometimes deploy suicide 
bombers in ways that also benefit Ahrar. 
Unlike the two jihadist groups, Ahrar 
al-Sham also receives state support from 
Turkey and Qatar, as well as private dona-
tions from the Gulf states. This aid has put 
the organisation in a position to be able to 
challenge ISIS together with its allies in 
the Islamic Front. But the Islamists and 
Salafists have not been able to defeat ISIS, 
which had to give up important positions 
in winter 2013/2014 but retained control 
of large parts of Raqqa and other towns in 
eastern Syria. 
Consequences for German Policies 
The most important consequence of the 
strengthening of the jihadists is that 
the Assad regime is today more firmly in 
the saddle than at any time since the rebel-
lion broke out. Reality has increasingly 
come to resemble the regime’s propaganda 
that from the outset branded its opponents 
as terrorists and advertised itself as a bas-
tion of stability and legitimacy. Washing-
ton finds itself forced by the latest develop-
ments to approach Syria with greater 
caution, while the conflicts between the 
Islamic Front and the jihadists weaken the 
insurgency as a whole. For these reasons, 
Assad could hold on for years to come. 
This conclusion is hard to bear if one 
considers that the Assad regime does not 
shrink from mass murder of civilians. None-
theless, Germany and Europe must respond 
to the danger posed by the jihadists, not 
least because many European Islamists have 
gone to fight in Syria. The Nusra Front and 
ISIS are becoming the biggest problem, 
having attracted the largest numbers of 
foreign fighters, but Europe should also 
keep a close eye on Ahrar al-Sham which 
is close to the jihadists. Its differences with 
the Nusra Front in particular are so mar-
ginal that assistance for Ahrar represents 
indirect support for the Nusra Front and 
must be avoided at all costs. 
The most important challenge in this 
connection is the difficult relationship with 
the Turkish government. Although repre-
sentatives of Western security agencies 
report progress on cooperation they still 
see it as far from satisfactory, largely on 
account of the Turkish political leadership. 
Since the beginning of the rebellion Turkey 
has supported various insurgent forces 
including the jihadists. The latter maintain 
their most important rear bases in Turkey 
and foreign fighters transit largely unhin-
dered through the country. Ankara only 
stopped giving direct support to the Nusra 
Front a few months ago. The most impor-
tant recipients of Turkish (and Qatari) assis-
tance are now Ahrar al-Sham and the 
Islamic Front. 
Its toleration of jihadists and promotion 
of Salafist groups must raise doubts about 
the soundness of the Turkish government’s 
judgement on security matters. Even before 
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 the Syrian uprising, militant Islamists 
were only regarded as problematic if they 
attacked Turkey. It will therefore be im-
portant for Germany and other European 
governments to convince Ankara that this 
line is also endangering its own security – 
not least because there are also several 
hundred Turks fighting with the jihadists. 
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